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ABSTRACT

Research suggests that adolescents as young as 13 years old reason about such abstract rights as freedom of speech and religion. It is unclear whether such reasoning develops earlier. Also unclear is the role of adults as agents in inculating in children the adults' views on such rights. A study examined 184 Canadian students in the first, third, and seventh grades. Researchers interviewed half the students concerning free speech issues and the other half on religious freedom questions. The students reacted to stories in which an authority prohibits agents from exercising the right in question. The research examined such issues in three social contexts: (1) the general level of society; (2) the school setting; and (3) the family. In the stories, the agents were either adults or eight-year olds. Researchers assessed the legitimacy of the prohibition, evaluation of the rule, universality, and evaluation of the violation. In general, affirmations of freedom tended to increase with age and there was a correlation between authority prohibition and rule evaluation results. Freedom of religion produced greater numbers of affirmations, and freedoms in general were affirmed in higher numbers for adults than children. The document calls for further research. Thirteen references and three tables are attached. (SG)

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The Role of Social Context and Agent in the Development of Abstract Rights Concepts

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The Role of Social Context and Agent in the Development of

Abstract Rights Concepts

Abstract rights such as freedom of speech and religion ("civil liberties") are important concepts associated with modern democratic political systems. Recent research (Helwig, 1991) has found that adolescents as young as 13 years-of-age reason about these rights as universal or moral rights not contingent on the existence of laws and generalizable across societal contexts, in accordance with findings on other moral concepts (Nucci, 1982; Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 1981). Adolescents used concepts of abstract rights to critically evaluate laws and social systems that restrict rights and freedoms. These results suggest that sophisticated concepts of abstract rights emerge by early adolescence. We do not know, however, whether these concepts appear earlier in development. Moreover, Helwig (1991) investigated only one type of authority regulation of abstract rights—governmental prohibition—at the general level of society. More information is needed on reasoning about rights like freedom of speech and religion in other social contexts such as the school or family. Do abstract rights concepts develop first in respect to the limitations of governmental authority or in the more local contexts of particular social institutions (e.g., family or school) with which the child is more directly familiar?

A second issue is the role played by type of agent (adult vs. child) in judgments of rights. Controversy and disagreement abound regarding whether children should be seen as having the same "intellectual" rights as adults (Moshman, 1986; Wringe, 1981). Arguments for the restriction or curtailment of children's rights to freedom of expression and religion are often based on assumptions about the special characteristics of children as agents (e.g., their impressionability or ability to assimilate information) or on the rights of parents or authorities to inculcate and transmit values held to be important (for a discussion of these issues in relation to adolescent rights, see Helwig, in press; Moshman, in press). This is an area where developmental differences in psychological knowledge (concepts of person) are expected to impact moral judgment. Do children and adults similarly distinguish type of agent when reasoning about the boundaries of authority regulation of individual rights?

To examine these issues, judgments and reasoning about the rights of children and adults to freedom of speech and religion were investigated in three types of social context: the general level of society, the institutional context of the school, and the family. Attention was paid to formal aspects of rights as well as substantive rationales serving to ground civil liberties like freedom of speech and religion. A defining feature of civil liberties as recognized by many moral and political philosophers (Dworkin, 1977; Gewirth, 1982) is that they are rights held against authorities such as the state, generating obligations of non-interference on the part of relevant authorities (e.g., government). This reflects a formal property of moral rights known as the correlativity of rights and obligations. Accordingly, a conception of civil liberties as rights held against particular authorities should lead to

negative evaluations of rules or laws restricting these freedoms, and a rejection of the legitimacy of authorities to make such regulations.

It is important to distinguish conceptions of rights from the issue of their overridingness in judgments of acts, especially in complex or conflicted situations requiring the coordination of diverse social concepts (Killen, 1990). Judgments about whether, for example, it is permissible to violate an authority prohibition on exercising a right are likely to evoke additional issues such as conceptions of authority and obedience, punishment concerns, and other perceived consequences associated with rule violation, immediate and otherwise. For this reason, it is expected that individuals may hold abstract, formal conceptions of civil liberties (as defined above) and yet not always judge violations of rules restricting freedoms as permissible.

This approach contrasts with certain global stage perspectives (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981), whose major focus is on judgments of acts in complex social conflicts ("moral dilemmas"). Kohlberg (1981) has argued that rights are not conceptualized as human or natural rights or liberties until individuals have reached the principled level (attained in late adolescence or adulthood by a minority of the population in Western societies). This perspective may have underestimated conceptions of abstract rights in adolescence and childhood by failing to probe directly relevant conceptual criteria (e.g., correlativity, generalizability) and by giving too much importance to overridingness in act evaluations. The current study attempts to address these concerns by including separate assessments of authority legitimacy, rule evaluations, universality (generalizability) and judgments of rule violations as these dimensions relate to conceptions of civil liberties in early childhood through young adulthood.

Method

Subjects

The sample consisted of 184 Canadian subjects in 4 grade levels: 1st grade (mean age 6-6, range 5-9 to 7-6), 3rd grade (mean age 8-7, range 7-7 to 9-6), 5th grade (mean age 10-5, range 9-0 to 11-5), and 7th grade (mean age 12-4, range 10-10 to 13-5). Subjects were recruited from a public science museum and a university operated school in Toronto. The predominant socioeconomic and racial makeup of the sample was middle class and Caucasian. An adult comparison sample of 48 subjects, drawn from a large public university, was also collected (only preliminary findings for a portion of this sample will be reported here).

Assessments and Procedures

Half the subjects were given an interview pertaining to freedom of speech, and the other half were given freedom of religion (the only exception involved 1st graders, where 16 subjects received freedom of religion instead of the standard 24 subjects in each right/age grouping). In each interview, stories were presented in which an authority prohibits agents from exercising the right in question. For freedom of speech, the issue was authority prohibition of

speech involving rock music; for freedom of religion, the issue was authority prohibition of a hypothetical religious practice. Each example was presented in unharmful contexts; for example, the rock music in question did not contain violent or profane lyrics, and the specific religious practice involved reciting a prayer as part of a religious ritual. These examples were chosen to represent straightforward instances of restrictions of basic rights and freedoms appropriate for a wide age range, in accordance with one of the central purposes of the study: to investigate the origins of basic (prototypical) conceptions of civil liberties in young childhood.

Three conditions varying social contexts (societal, school and family) were given, each containing two subconditions varying agent (adult vs. 8-year-old-child). As an example, in the freedom of religion/familial context/child agent condition, a child who wants to belong to a different religion from his/her parents is prohibited from saying a "special" prayer associated with the religion. Prohibitions were coordinated with the scope of the relevant authority's characteristic sphere of influence—parents (familial context) made house rules, principals (school context) made school rules, and governments (societal context) made laws applying to society at large. Gender of all agents in the stories was matched to that of the subject.

For each social context/agent condition, assessments were made of (1) the legitimacy of authority prohibition (is it ok or not ok for authority to make rule?), (2) evaluation of the rule (is it a good or bad rule?), (3) universality (is it ok or not ok for authorities in another country to make rule; would it be a good rule or bad rule?) and (4) evaluation of rule violation (would it be ok or not ok for agent to break rule?). Presentation order of the three social contexts and two agent conditions was systematically counterbalenced within each subgroup of age by sex. Interviews were tape-recorded for analysis. Both evaluations (yes/no responses) and justifications were assessed for all questions, and a coding scheme was developed from a portion of the data for subsequent analyses.

Results

For the purpose of analysis, a dichotomous categorization of evaluations was generated comprised of evaluations affirming civil liberties (for example, negative evaluations of rules restricting civil liberties, positive evaluations of acts violating such rules) and freedom non-affirming responses (for example, endorsements of rules restricting freedoms and negative evaluations of rule violations). Unresolved multiple evaluations (e.g., simultaneous ok and not ok responses), "depends", and "don't know" responses were collapsed into the non-affirming category.

Table 1 presents the percentage of subjects at each age level who affirmed freedoms (all questions). A number of general patterns are evident. First, for most context/agent conditions, affirmations of freedoms tended to increase with age, with the largest difference occurring between the 1st and 3rd grade groups. Second, results for the legitimacy of authority prohibition question and rule evaluations were highly similar (rule evaluations tending to show

slighty more affirmations, on balance), with affirmations ranging from 56-100%. In contrast, rule violations tended to produce much lower levels of affirmations of freedoms (percentages range from 17-54% for freedom of speech, and 19-83% for freedom of religion). Third, freedom of religion produced greater numbers of affirmations than freedom of speech for most conditions. And, finally, freedoms were affirmed in greater numbers for adult than child agents.

Justifications for affirmations of freedoms included references to personal agency, wants, desires, and individual choice (e.g., "she should be able to do that because that's what she likes to talk about"; "it's the person's own business"), as well as references to the unharmful nature of the act (e.g., "practicing your religion doesn't hurt anybody"). Some subjects viewed restrictions of freedoms themselves as entailing psychological harm to individuals. Justifications for non-affirmations of freedoms (Table 2) tended to focus on authority, punishment, and rules or laws. As indicated in the table, references to punishment declined and references to rules or laws increased with age. Reference to authority was the most frequent justification category for non-affirmations at all age levels, remaining relatively constant across age (33-38%). Other justifications used by a much smaller proportion of subjects included statements referring to the the inability of child agents to make knowledgable or informed choices, to the importance of exercising control and authority (usually parental authority) as an instrument of socialization, to the relativity of social or psychological systems across cultural contexts (found exclusively in responses to the universality questions) and simple, unelaborated references to child status.

Non-parametric statistics (Chi-square and McNemar) were used to examine effects of age, context, agent, and freedom type (speech vs. religion) on evaluations (justification analyses are currently underway and will not be reported here). A preliminary analysis of sex was conducted on evaluations for all interview questions. Only 1 out of 60 Chi-square comparisons was significant, which is well within the number expected by chance. The variable of sex was thus collapsed for all subsequent analyses.

Age Effects.

Statistical tests (Chi-square) revealed no significant differences among the older age groups (grades 3, 5, and 7) on any question. These groups were thus combined and contrasted with the youngest age group (grade 1). Numerous significant differences were found. Results for individual assessments follow.

Legitimacy of Authority Prohibition. For freedom of speech, 1st grade subjects were less likely to view it as wrong for authorities to make rules prohibiting freedom of speech in Canada in the societal context for both adult and child agents ($X^2(1) = 9.51$, $p < .005$; $X^2(1) = 7.90$, $p < .005$, respectively), and for adult agents in the school and family contexts ($X^2(1) = 13.93$, $p < .001$; $X^2(1) = 6.46$, $p < .025$, respectively). For freedom of religion, 1st graders were less likely to view it as wrong for school principals in Canada to make rules prohibiting relgious freedom for both adult

and child agents ($X^2(1) = 3.87$, $p < .05$; $X^2(1) = 10.38$, $p < .005$, respectively).

Rule Evaluation. Results for rule evaluations were very similar, with 1st graders less likely to negatively evaluate rules restricting freedom of speech in Canada for both adult and child agents in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 13.83$, $p < .001$; $X^2(1) = 8.57$, $p < .005$, respectively), the school context ($X^2(1) = 6.22$, $p < .025$, adult agents; $X^2(1) = 9.12$, $p < .005$ child agents) and for adult agents in the family context ($X^2(1) = 10.19$, $p < .005$). The only significant difference for freedom of religion, showing a similar pattern, involved child agents in the school context ($X^2 = 3.87$, $p < .05$).

Rule Violation. Assessments of rule violations produced fewer affirmations of freedoms than the other types of assessments. Age comparisons showed no significant differences for freedom of speech. Comparisons for freedom of religion revealed a number of significant differences, with 1st grade subjects less likely to judge as acceptable violations of rules restricting freedoms in the societal and family contexts for adult agents ($X^2(1) = 5.70$, $p < .025$; $X^2(1) = 6.6$, $p < .025$, respectively), and in the school context for adult and child agents ($X^2 = 4.09$, $p < .05$, adult agents; $X^2(1) = 8.41$, $p < .025$, child agents).

Universality. Assessments of the legitimacy of authority prohibitions and rule evaluations in other countries were similar to Canada, with 1st grade subjects less likely to affirm freedoms in other countries than older age groups. Numerous comparisons between the 1st grade and the combined older age groups were significant. For freedom of speech, 1st graders were less likely to state it would be wrong for authorities in other countries to restrict the freedom of adult and child agents in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 7.75$, $p < .01$; $X^2(1) = 11.05$, $p < .001$, respectively) in the family context ($X^2(1) = 12.67$, $p < .001$; $X^2(1) = 4.00$, $p < .05$, respectively), and for child agents in the school context ($X^2 = 7.19$, $p < .01$). For freedom of religion, 1st graders were less likely to judge it wrong for authorities in other countries to prohibit the religious freedom of adult and child agents in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 11.87$, $p < .001$; $X^2 = 8.93$, $p < .005$, respectively), and child agents in the school context ($X^2(1) = 5.68$, $p < .025$). Results for rule evaluations in other countries showed that 1st graders were less likely than older subjects to negatively evaluate rules restricting freedom of speech for adult and child agents in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 12.84$, $p < .001$; $X^2(1) = 5.46$, $p < .025$, respectively), for child agents in the school context ($X^2(1) = 8.57$, $p < .005$), and for adult agents in the family context ($X^2(1) = 9.84$, $p < .005$). They were also less likely to negatively evaluate rules in other countries restricting freedom of religion for adult and child agents in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 5.45$, $p < .025$; $X^2(1) = 8.56$, $p < .005$, respectively).

Agent Comparisons

Conditions with adult agents tended, in general, to produce more affirmations of freedoms than those with child agents (Table 1). Differences between agents were examined for each question using McNemar's statistic for

repeated measure designs. Analyses of the effects of agent (with age groups collapsed) showed that subjects overall were more likely to state that it would be wrong for school principals in Canada to restrict freedom of speech for adult than child agents($p < .04$) and to judge it more acceptable for adults to violate such rules than children ($p < .0005$). Subjects were also more likely to view violations of rules restricting freedom of speech in the family context as acceptable for adult than child agents ($p < .008$). Results for freedom of religion showed that affirmations of freedoms were more likely for adult than child agents in the family context (every question significant, $p < .0003$).

The effect of agent was examined within each age group, again using McNemar's statistic. No differences between child and adult agents were found at any grade level for freedom of speech. Comparisons for freedom of religion revealed several significant differences, all in the family context, and all involving the three older age groups. The 3rd grade subjects were more likely to judge it permissible for adults than children to violate family rules restricting freedom of religion in Canada ($p < .04$), and to affirm freedoms for adult agents in other countries ($p < .02$, legitimacy of authority prohibition question; $p < .04$, rule evaluation). The 5th grade subjects were more likely to state that it would be wrong for families in Canada and other countries to prohibit freedom of religion for adults than children ($p < .008$, for Canada; $p < .02$, other countries). The 7th grade subjects were more likely to view it as wrong for parents to restrict freedom of religion in Canada for adults than children ($p < .04$), to negatively evaluate such parental rules for adults more than for children ($p < .02$), and to judge it as more acceptable for adults to violate such rules ($p < .008$).

Freedom Comparisons: Speech vs. Religion.

Affirmations of freedoms were more frequent for religion than speech in most conditions (see Table 1). Comparisons (Chi-square) conducted between speech and religion (with age collapsed) resulted in five significant tests. Subjects were more likely to maintain that it would be wrong for authorities in Canada to restrict freedom of religion than freedom of speech for children in the societal context ($X^2(1) = 4.20$, $p < .05$), and for adults in the family ($X^2(1) = 8.01$, $p < .0045$). They also judged violations of rules restricting freedom of religion as more permissible than violations of rules restricting freedom of speech for adult agents in the school ($X^2(1) = 6.97$, $p < .009$) and family contexts ($X^2(1) = 9.65$, $p < .002$), and for child agents in the school context ($X^2(1) = 14.44$, $p < .0002$).

Comparisons between freedom of speech and religion conducted within each age group showed 1st graders as less likely to judge it wrong for authorities in Canada to prohibit adult agents' freedom of speech than religion in the family context ($X^2 = 7.11$, $p < .008$), and more likely to negatively evaluate rules restricting adults' freedom of religion in the family ($X^2 = 4.86$, $p < .03$). Both the 5th and 7th grade groups were more likely to judge violation of rules restricting freedom of religion as acceptable for children in the school context ($X^2(1) = 6.76$, $p < .01$, for 5th grade; $X^2(1) = 5.69$, $p < .02$ for 7th grade) and for adults in the family ($X^2(1) = 8.39$, $p < .004$ for 5th grade; $X^2(1) = 4.75$, $p < .03$, for 7th grade). There were no significant

differences between freedom of speech and religion for third grade subjects.

Context Comparisons.

McNemar's statistic was used to examine differences among the three social contexts (societal, school, family) for each corresponding question (legitimacy, rule evaluation, rule violation and universality assessments) in each matched agent condition. Findings for analyses of effects of context (collapsed across age) suggested that affirmations of freedoms were least likely in the family context. Twenty-two out of 23 significant comparisons showed fewer affirmations of freedom in the family context when compared with either the school context (10 significant comparisons) or the societal context (12 significant comparisons).

In order to examine age patterns, comparisons (McNemar) among social contexts were conducted within each grade level. Results indicated that a greater distinction between the family and other contexts emerged with age, though at different rates for freedom of speech and religion. For freedom of speech, only one comparison was significant among the 1st and 3rd grade groups, with 1st graders more likely to state that it would be wrong for authorities to prohibit adults' freedom of speech in other countries in the school than the family context ($p < .04$). The 5th grade group distinguished the family context from both the societal and school contexts, showing fewer affirmations of freedom of speech in the family. Specifically, 5th grade subjects were less likely to state that it would be wrong for authorities in Canada to make rules prohibiting adults' and children's freedom of speech in the family than in either the societal or school contexts ($p < .04$ for school/family comparisons and $p < .02$ for societal/family comparisons). They were also less likely to judge as wrong family rules restricting children's freedom of speech in other countries than comparable school rules ($p < .04$). Seventh graders distinguished between the family and societal contexts for child agents only, being less likely to state that it would be wrong for authorities to prohibit freedom of speech in the family than in society at large $p < .02$, for Canada; $p < .04$, for other countries), and less likely to negatively evaluate such rules in the family context ($p < .04$, for Canada).

Results for freedom of religion showed that differences between the family and other contexts emerged for child agents somewhat earlier than for freedom of speech (3rd grade as opposed to 5th grade). Though no significant differences were found for the 1st grade group, third graders were less likely to view it as wrong for authorities to make rules prohibiting children's freedom of religion in the family than in the school ($p < .02$, for Canada; $p < .004$, other countries) or society at large ($p < .04$, for Canada; $p < .008$, other countries), and they were less likely to negatively evaluate such rules in the family than the school ($p < .02$, for Canada; $p < .04$, for other countries) or society ($p < .02$, for Canada; $p < .04$ for other countries). One significant comparison was found between the societal and school contexts, with 3rd graders more likely to judge as acceptable in Canada adult violations of school rules prohibiting freedom of religion than societal laws ($p < .02$). Findings for the 5th grade group were highly similar, with these subjects less likely to view it as wrong for authorities to make rules restricting children's

freedom of religion in the family than in the school ($p < .02$, for Canada; $p < .008$, for other countries) or in society ($p < .002$, for Canada; $p < .004$, for other countries), and less likely to negatively evaluate such rules in the family than in society ($p < .03$, for Canada; $p < .008$, for other countries). The 7th grade group was similarly less likely to judge it wrong for authorities in Canada and other countries to make rules restricting children's freedom of religion in the family than in society ($p < .04$). They were also less likely to negatively evaluate such rules in the family than in the school ($p < .008$, for Canada; $p < .03$, for other countries) or society ($p < .02$, Canada; $p < .008$, other countries) and less likely to judge violations of family rules as acceptable than school rules ($p < .04$, Canada). In one exception to the overall pattern of fewer affirmations of freedom of speech in the family context, 7th graders were found to be more likely to judge adult violations of family rules acceptable than violations of societal laws ($p < .04$).

Adult Comparison Group

Preliminary data (50% of sample) for the adult comparison group may be found in Table 3. The adult responses are, in general, quite similar to those of the 7th grade group, with two noteworthy exceptions. Adults appear to be more likely to judge as acceptable violations of societal laws restricting civil liberties, especially with respect to freedom of religion. More striking are the findings for child agents' freedom of religion in the family context. Adults showed an even greater distinction between children's rights in the familial, societal and school contexts than evident among 7th graders. For example, only 50% of adults thought it wrong for parents to make rules restricting a child's freedom of religion, while 100% thought it would be wrong for governments to do so. And, while 75% of adults judged it acceptable for children to violate governmental laws restricting freedom of religion, only 33% judged violations of similar parental rules permissible! Indeed, a smaller proportion of adults than 7th graders affirmed children's freedom of religion in the family context for all assessments.

Discussion

The pattern of results obtained demonstrates the importance of examining judgments of rights along a number of criteria, including assessments of the legitimacy of authority prohibitions, direct judgments of rules restricting rights, and judgments of acts violating such rules. In virtually every instance, judgments of rule violations produced fewer affirmations of freedoms than the other forms of assessment, suggesting this measure is a particularly conservative one that may underestimate early rights understandings.

In line with this view, findings from the rule evaluations and legitimacy assessments suggest that conceptions of abstract rights appear to have emerged by 6 years of age. The majority of 6-year-olds (though only a slight majority for freedom of speech) affirmed freedoms for child and adult agents in most contexts, judging clearcut (prototypical) restrictions on freedom of speech and religion as wrong and outside the scope of governmental, school, and familial authority. These early rights concepts were based on conceptions of human

agency and personal choice (Nucci & Lee, 1992). Appeals for freedom were justified with reference to individual desires and wants and the prerogative of agents to act in accordance with their intentions, free from the interference of authorities. The many significant differences found between the 6 year-olds and older age groups point to an important developmental milestone for basic rights concepts occurring sometime between 6 and 8 years of age. By 8 years of age, the basic features of concepts of freedom of speech and religion as rights "held against" authorities appear firmly in place (at least for societal and school contexts), and remain stable throughout development.

Developmentally, conceptions of freedom of religion were found to be prior to freedom of speech. For example, only 58% of 1st graders believed it was not legitimate for the government to restrict speech about rock music, while a full 81% judge similar restrictions on religious practices as wrong. One possible explanation for this "decalage" comes from a consideration of the justifications used to support freedom of religion. In addition to personal agency and choice, many subjects also made reference to religious rules and requirements in affirming religious freedom (e.g., "she has to do that for her religion"). The existence of a religious system of obligation may have given additional weight to subjects' consideration of agents' claims beyond that already lent by personal agency and choice. Freedom of speech, by contrast, represents a more straightforward case of conflict between strictly individual expression and authority mandates.

Interestingly, the relative abstractness or proximity of different systems of authority did not seem to affect children's early rights concepts. The youngest subjects did not distinguish different types of authority (governmental, school, or familial), holding rights against these different authorities in about the same proportions for child and adult agents. This finding would be consistent with the view that developing conceptions of rights are at first closely tied with emerging notions of personal agency, with little consideration of how these general agentic notions are to be coordinated with specific authority demands in different social contexts. With age emerged a very clear tendency to view restrictions on children's freedoms stemming from parental authority as more legitimate than other types, especially for freedom of religion. The "specialness" of the family context emerged earlier for religion than speech, a trend echoing the general precocity of judgments of freedom of religion. Most striking, perhaps, is the finding of a decline in affirmations of children's religious freedom in the family in adulthood. Only 50% of the adult comparison sample believed it unacceptable for parents to make rules restricting the religious freedom of 8-year-old children, in contrast to 71% of 7th graders. Violation of school rules and government laws restricting child agents' religious freedom was much more likely to be judged acceptable than violation of similar parental rules.

The justifications provided by adults who failed to affirm children's religious freedom frequently made reference to the inability of 8-year-olds to make informed decisions about religious membership, and the prerogative of parents to raise or socialize their children as they wish. This contrasts with the reasoning of adults who affirmed children's rights to religious freedom. These adults clearly regarded children as intellectually equipped to make such

choices, viewing parental intrusion in this matter as excessive and potentially damaging. Considerable variation appears to exist in adults' conceptions of children's intellectual capacities, a fact that may impact decisions about children's rights (Moshman, in press). Further research is needed to determine how much variation in judgments of children's rights can be accounted for by differences in conceptions of children's agency and ability.

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Table 1

Percentage of Subjects Giving Freedom-Affirming Responses, All Assessments

I. Legitimacy of Authority Prohibition (% saying wrong for authority to make rule):

SPEECH

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	58	62	79	79	83	96	100	100
School	58	58	79	92	79	92	83	96
Family	58	46	58	75	54	67	70	88

RELIGION

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	81	75	88	92	96	96	96	96
School	56	75	88	96	92	88	96	100
Family	81	88	58	79	50	83	71	96

II. Rule Evaluation (% evaluating rule as bad):

SPEECH

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	67	62	88	88	92	100	100	100
School	58	71	83	88	92	96	92	96
Family	62	54	75	83	71	88	75	92

RELIGION

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	88	81	96	100	96	92	96	96
School	75	88	96	100	88	92	100	100
Family	73	88	67	88	62	83	67	96

III. Rule Violation (% saying violation of rule would be ok):

SPEECH

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	29	35	33	38	38	50	54	50
School	17	38	38	54	29	50	46	54
Family	17	29	42	50	17	25	38	54

RELIGION

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	25	19	46	46	62	62	58	58
School	25	44	58	75	67	67	79	79
Family	19	31	33	58	42	67	50	83

Table 1 (cont'd)

Universality Judgments

IV. Legitimacy of Authority Prohibition (other countries):

SPEECH

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	52	57	79	83	83	88	100	92
School	54	65	83	79	83	83	88	88
Family	43	38	71	79	62	67	75	92

RELIGION

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	56	56	88	91	92	96	92	92
School	60	81	92	83	88	75	88	92
Family	53	62	54	83	54	83	67	88

V. Rule Evaluation (other countries):

SPEECH

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	70	62	83	87	92	100	100	96
School	61	74	83	83	96	88	91	88
Family	52	50	74	78	71	83	79	92

RELIGION

	GRADE 1		3		5		7	
CONTEXT	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Societal	62	69	88	92	96	96	96	92
School	73	88	92	91	88	83	96	88
Family	69	69	65	88	62	83	62	88

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Table 2

Justifications Used in Non-Affirmations of Freedoms By Grade Level

	Grade			
Justification	1	3	5	7
Don't Know/ Unelaborated	29	12	6	2
Authority	33	36	38	33
Punishment	21	26	16	13
Rules/Law	8	12	17	25
Absence of Knowledge/ Informed Choice	0	0	2	7
Relativism	4	4	4	6
Child Status (unelaborated)	2	3	4	4
Socialization	1	3	4	4
Misc. Other	2	4	9	6

Note. Table gives percentage of justifications used (all questions) for non-affirmation evaluations.

Table 3

Adult Comparison Sample (Preliminary Data): Percentage of Subjects Giving Freedom Affirming Responses in Each Condition.

SPEECH:

	CONTEXT					
	Societal		School		Family	
Question	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Legitimacy of Prohib.	100	100	92	100	75	75
Rule Eval.	100	100	92	100	83	100
Rule Viol.	50	75	50	83	58	50

Note. Data for 50% of sample (12 subjects).

RELIGION:

	CONTEXT					
	Societal		School		Family	
Question	Child	Adult	Child	Adult	Child	Adult
Legitimacy of Prohib.	100	100	92	100	50	100
Rule Eval.	100	100	92	100	58	100
Rule Viol.	75	100	67	67	33	100

Note. Data for 50% of sample (12 subjects).